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Abstract—Near field communication (NFC) is a standard-
based, radio frequency (RF), wireless communication technology
that allows data to be exchanged between devices that are less
than 20 cm apart. NFC security protocols require formal security
analysis before massive adoptions, in order to check whether
these protocols meet its requirements and goals. In this paper
we formally analyse NFC-based mobile coupon protocols using
formal methods (Casper/FDR). We find an attack against the
advanced protocol, and then we provide a solution that addresses
the vulnerability formally.
Index Terms—NFC, M-coupon, Casper, FDR, formal methods,
model checking
I. INTRODUCTION
Near Field Communication (NFC) is a technology that
enables people to make payments, for example at the super-
market or the train station, just by waving their mobile at the
point of sale. NFC is a standard-based radio frequency (RF)
communication link technology that can be embedded into
any device (computers, mobiles, PDA, TV, printers, etc.), in
order to allow data to be exchanged between devices that are
less than 10 cm apart [1]. NFC tends to be in mobile phones
more since the majority of people already have one. NFC
in mobiles can operate in three different modes determined
by the application used; it can communicate with other NFC
mobiles in Peer-to-Peer mode, or communicate with a passive
RFID/NFC tag in reader/writer mode, or communicate with
an NFC reader in card emulation mode [2].
The requirement for robust security in NFC in general has
been emphasised in the literature [3], [4]. NFC-SEC standards
[5], [6] enable two NFC devices, in Peer-to-Peer mode, to
establish a secure channel. However, they do not provide
entity authentication, and are not suitable for applications
requiring specific security mechanisms. For any NFC appli-
cation, cryptography is the ideal measure to address security
requirements, such as confidentiality, integrity and availability.
The NFC mobile coupon application (M-coupon) is one of
the promising and popular applications [7]–[10]. The NFC M-
coupon system requires secure issuing and cashing of the M-
coupons, otherwise it can cause huge losses for a company
[11], and damage to its reputation. Dominikus and Aigner
[12] introduced NFC M-coupon protocols which allow secure
issuing and cashing of electronic coupons.
On the other hand, formal security analysis has not been
carried out in the NFC domain in general. Such analysis
is important because implementing strong cryptographic al-
gorithms in NFC schemes is only half of the solution. In
fact, the way encryption is used between entities is the more
challenging part of protocol design. It is quite difficult to
establish secure cryptographic protocols even with robust cryp-
tographic algorithms. Many attacks can be realised during the
execution of the cryptographic protocols just by intercepting
and replaying encrypted messages between entities, without
decrypting any messages [13]. Thus, formal security analysis
of NFC protocols in general, and especially the NFC M-
coupon protocol, is critically important before their widespread
adoption.
In our analysis we use Communicating Sequential Processes
(CSP) [14], with its model checker Failures Divergence Re-
finement (FDR), which is proven to be an effective method in
analysing the security of protocols [15]. However, modelling
protocols in CSP is not a trivial task. Lowe developed Casper
[16], a tool that allows the user to write an abstract description
of a security protocol, which the tool compiles to CSP code
for direct checking with the model-checker FDR2. Casper has
been used to analyse many protocols [17], which confirms its
capability to find vulnerabilities.
In this paper we use Casper to formally analyse the NFC
M-coupon protocols proposed by Dominikus and Aigner [12].
We found an attack against the advanced protocol. We then
we propose a solution to address this vulnerability. We use the
same approach to formally verify that the corrected version
does not suffer from the same flaw.
II. THE NFC MOBILE COUPON PROTOCOLS
The NFC M-coupon system has a typical scenario, as
illustrated in Figure 1. Initially, all parties will have NFC
capability, in order to communicate with each other. Firstly,
a user brings his NFC mobile close to an NFC issuer (smart
poster, newspaper). Then an M-coupon is issued and sent to
his mobile. Later, the user goes to the shop for cashing in
the M-coupon to the cashier. The cashier may authenticate the
user before the cashier provides the promised bonus. Only the
cashier needs to have online access, whereas the issuer and
the user can be offline.
Figure 1. General NFC mobile coupon
A. NFC M-coupon security requirements
Dominikus and Aigner [12] stated four security require-
ments for NFC M-coupon protocols:
• No Multiple Cash-in: An attacker shall not be able to
use the same M-coupon multiple times.
• No Unauthorized Generation: An attacker shall not be
able to issue his own M-Coupons.
• No Manipulation: M-Coupons shall not stay valid after
a manipulation.
• No Unauthorized Copying: An attacker shall not be able
to produce a valid copy of an M-coupon and cash it in.
Depending on the M-coupon system, the properties No Mul-
tiple Cash-in and No Unauthorized Copying can be optional.
In [12], two protocols were presented: a simple and an ad-
vanced M-coupon protocols. The advanced protocol addresses
all four requirements. The simple protocol addresses the same
requirements except for No Unauthorized Copying of the M-
coupon.
Different approaches were used to address these require-
ments. Firstly, No Multiple Cash-in is addressed by establish-
ing data bases for all M-coupons used at all cashiers. All new
M-coupons can be checked online before cashing in, in order
to prevent multiple cash-ins. There is no need for encryp-
tion countermeasures to meet this requirement. Secondly, No
Unauthorized Generation is addressed by establishing long
term shared keys between cashiers and issuers (symmetric
authentication). Thirdly, No Manipulation is addressed by
relying on the secrecy of the long term shared keys between
cashiers and issuers: any change in the M-coupon would be
detected. Finally, No Unauthorized Copying is addressed by
embedding a user’s signature inside the M-coupon.
No Multiple Cash-in is typically called protection against
Double-Spending. Unauthorized generation and manipulation
are both concerned with Forgery Protection. In order to be
more precise, the No Unauthorized Copying requirement can
be analysed as authentication of the M-coupon holder: User
Authentication.
B. Protocol descriptions
The simple and the advanced protocols are shown in Figure
2, designed according to the ISO authentication standard [18].
We use the notation of Table I in describing the protocols.
The Simple M-coupon protocol
The aim of this protocol is to provide genuine M-coupons
from genuine issuers. It allows users to copy their M-coupons
ID(i) Issuer ID.
ID(u) User ID.
ID(c) Cashier ID.
Offer Data about the Offer .
EK Shared key between Issuer(s) and Cashier(s)
Nu / Nu2 User’s nonce (random number).
Ni Issuer’s nonce.
Nc Cashier1’s nonce.
Nc’ Cashier2’s nonce.
SigU Signature of user’s Mobile.
SigC Signature of Cashier.
Table I
PROTOCOL NOTATION
for their family and friends. The protocol is given in Figure
2a.
Issuing phase: after the user brings his mobile close to the
issuer, his mobile sends a nonce (new random number) Nu
(message 1). Then, the Issuer sends the M-coupon to the user
(message 2). The M-coupon contains: the issuer identity, the
user’s random number, the promised offer and an encrypted
part. The encrypted part also contains the offer and the user’s
random number.
Cashing phase: the user can cash the M-coupon at any
cashier has a relationship with the issuer. The user brings his
mobile near the cashier and sends the M-coupon (message 3).
The cashier checks three things: firstly, the validity of the M-
coupon i.e. the M-coupon has not been used before (if required
by the system). Secondly, the encrypted part is equal to the
unencrypted part. Thirdly, the encryption key has a genuine
issuer. If all these conditions are satisfied, then the bonus is
given to the user (message 4).
The Advanced M-coupon protocol
The protocol works in two phases, as shown in Figure 2b.
Issuing phase: In the advanced protocol two messages are
added. After the user sends a random number (message 1),
the issuer sends a random number as well (message 2), and
asks the user to sign it (message 3). The issuer would not be
able to verify the signature, but the signature will be included
inside the encrypted part of the M-coupon (message 4). Later,
the cashier will verify the signature to make sure no one can
cash the M-coupon except the user who has signed it at the
issuing phase.
Cashing phase: The cashier verifies user’s signature in-
cluded inside the M-coupon (message 5), which was signed at
the issuing phase. Then, a further user authentication protocol
is performed in order to ensure that this is the same user. So,
the cashier sends a random number (message 6). Then the user
signs it (message 7) and sends it back to the cashier. If both
signatures (messages 5 and 7) are confirmed, then the bonus
is given to the user (message 8).
III. METHOD
Casper is a formal tool which analyses security protocols
at the formal or symbolic level. Casper uses the Dolev-Yao
attacker model [19]. Here the attacker has full control of the
Issuer User's Mobile Cashier
Nu
BONUS
ID(i), Nu, Offer, 
EK [Offer, Nu]
ID(i), Nu, Offer, 
EK [Offer, Nu]
1
2
4
3
(a) the simple M-coupon protocol
Issuer User's Mobile Cashier
Nu
ID(u), SigU( Ni )
Ni
Nc
ID(u), SigU( Nc )
BONUS
ID(i), Nu, Offer, 
EK [ID(u), Ni, SigU( Ni ), Offer, Nu] ID(i), Nu, Offer, 
EK [ID(u), Ni, SigU( Ni ), Offer, Nu]
1
2
4
3
5
6
8
7
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Figure 2. The simple and the advanced M-coupon protocols
network traffic, and is able to block, replay, redirect, spoof and
duplicate messages. However, the attacker can only encrypt or
decrypt if it holds the appropriate key, commonly known as
the perfect encryption assumption. It tries to break the security
protocol with these capabilities, using what has been provided
by the participants executing their part of the protocol.
In order to model a protocol in Casper, two main sections
need to be described. The first section is the protocol definition
which is a general description of the protocol in terms of the
participants and how they create and respond to messages. The
second section is the system definition which gives the specific
system runs of the protocol to be modelled, i.e. how many
issuers, users and cashiers should be modelled in the analysis.
Casper, or CSP, requires a specific system to be checked within
the protocol, to manage the size of the state to be explored.
The more simultaneous runs to be considered, the more states
to explore and the longer it is to analyse. The state space
grows exponentially with the number of runs, and exploration
becomes infeasable quite quickly; this is known as the state
explosion problem.
• In the simple protocol, we were able to check models
containing up to two issuers, two users and two cashiers.
• In the advanced protocol we checked two models: firstly
the whole protocol with one issuer, one user and one
cashier due to its complexity; secondly the cashing phase
with two issuers, two users and two cashiers.
The reason we model the cashing phase is to have a more
realistic model, and to have a better understanding of
attacks as we will explain later.
Then we model the requirements of the protocols:
• We model forgery protection, which addresses the
unauthorized generation and the manipulation of the M-
coupon. We can analyse this with two checks; firstly, we
examine the secrecy of the shared key between issuer(s)
and cashier(s). Secondly, we examine the authentication
between them.
• In addition, Double-spending, multiple cash-in, is the
next requirement that needs to be checked. Multiple runs
of the protocol (double-spending) are not managed by
the protocol itself but by a database at the cashier, which
knows all M-coupons used so far. It is an assumption
built into our model that the cashiers have such a database
and use it correctly. We are concerned with analysing for
attacks on the protocol itself, and not attacks on the use
of the database.
• Finally, user authentication is the last requirement,
which is considered only for the advanced protocol.
We can consider this by examining whether the user is
authenticated to the cashier properly.
Moreover, the analysis also requires us to define the initial
knowledge of the intruder. The intruder knows the following:
the identities of the issuer, the user and the cashier, and the
offer (since it is sent in clear). In addition the intruder has his
own public/private keys and nonces, so can act as a legitimate
user.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
With respect to forgery protection, FDR2 did not find
any attacks on either the simple or the advanced M-coupon
protocols.
However, an attack was found when we examine the pro-
tocol with respect to user authentication in the advanced
protocol. We categorise the attacks into two kinds: honest
agents attack and dishonest agents attack.
A. Honest agents attack
This attack was identified when analysing the whole ad-
vanced protocol model (the first model for analysing the
advanced protocol). Here, all agents behave honestly and thus
play their role correctly. Figure 3 is the attack trace provided
by Casper, shown in sequence diagram form. Messages from
1 to 8 show an attack on the authentication between the user
and the NFC issuer at the M-coupon issuing phase. This is
because neither the issuer nor the user is able to verify who
they received the message from.
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Figure 3. NFC mCoupon Attack Trace
Messages from 9 to 15 in Figure 3 is an attack on the
authentication between the user and the cashier, which is the
main goal of the advanced protocol.
The attack works as follows: in the original protocol (Figure
2b), the cashier verifies the first signature at message 5,
then the cashier needs to perform another challenge-response
protocol, consisting of messages from 6 to 8, in order to
prevent a replay attack. However, the signature does not show
to whom this signature is going to: the identity of the verifier
(Cashier) is missed. This vulnerability allows an intruder to
intercept and cash a genuine M-coupon, as shown in messages
from 9 to 15 in Figure 3. An intruder is able to acquire an
M-coupon signed by the original customer and subsequently
cash it. This makes the cashier believe he has completed a run
of the protocol with the user. Later when the real user comes
to cash his M-coupon, the cashier will not accept it because
he thinks the user is using the M-coupon twice.
The attack in reality is relying on the possibility of the
intruder performing a combination of skimming, eavesdrop-
ping and relay attacks [20], [21]. However, the relay attack
is a general attack against NFC technology [21]. Therefore,
if an intruder was able to relay messages between entities to
exploit this vulnerability, the attack would work in any case
even with a fixed secure protocol. There are some techniques
for addressing NFC relay attacks, discussed in [21].
Even though authentication between the issuer and the
user’s mobile is not intended to be addressed by the protocol,
it breaks the assumption that the M-coupon issued is linked
to the user present at a particular geographical location.
B. Dishonest agent attack
There is another attack if there is a dishonest agent engaging
in the protocol, as illustrated in Figure 4. Entities coloured in
gray are the dishonest ones with their collaborative intruders.
In Figure 4a, a dishonest cashier (Cashier 1) can forward
the M-coupon to a collaborative intruder at another cashier
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Figure 4. Attacks against the advanced M-coupon Protocol
(Cashier 2) who would be able to cash it. Then the dishonest
cashier will tell the user he has already used his M-coupon
at Cashier 2, and generate an error. When the user complains
to the company, the investigation would show the user did
indeed cash his M-coupon at Cashier 2, and will not find any
evidence that the user had been circumvented. Separately to
the protocol the user might be able to prove his presence at
another location at the time that the M-coupon was cashed,
but it would be very hard to find out who is the dishonest
cashier, or to prove Cashier 1 was dishonest.
Figure 4b shows another possible attack with a dishonest
user. The user can cash the M-coupon to a distant cashier
(Cashier 2), then send the M-coupon to the near one (Cashier
1). Of course, Cashier 1 will reject the M-coupon since it has
been used at Cashier 2, but the user will complain that he did
not cash it because he is now at the location of Cashier 1.
V. SUGGESTED SOLUTION
The authors, Dominikus and Aigner, have followed the
ISO authentication standard [18] when they developed their
protocol, which insists on including the identity of the verifier
(Cashier) in order to address possible attacks. Nevertheless,
the standard allows the omission of the identity of the verifier
if the protocol is in a single direction, i.e., a client and server
without server authentication, where the client is only ever
authenticated to one server [18]. The NFC M-coupon protocol
is not an example of such a system, as it is very likely
to have many cashiers in the scheme. We recommend that
the suggestion put forward by the standard, of omitting the
identity of the verifier, should not be followed in this M-
coupon system. An attack was found when the identity of the
verifier was omitted.
In order to make this protocol more secure, there are two
aspects which should be addressed; the protocol configuration,
and the NFC configuration.
From the protocol’s perspective, a user should include the
identity of the verifier in any signature. At least the user must
include the identity of a cashier in the user’s authentication
performed by a cashier (Figure 2b messages 5 to 8). The best
way to do this is by a mutual authentication between the user’s
mobile and the cashier. Figure 5 is a modified version (with
fewer messages) of the advanced protocol, which we designed
according to the ISO authentication standard [18]. After the
issuer sends a nonce to the user’s mobile (message 1), the
user’s mobile signs the issuer’s nonce and combines it with
his identity and a nonce (message 2). Then, the issuer sends
the M-coupon to the user (message 3). In the cashing phase,
a mutual authentication is done between the user’s mobile
and the cashier. The cashier sends his identity and a nonce
(message 4). At message 5, the user sends a signature of the
M-coupon, the cashier’s nonce, a new nonce generated by the
user’s mobile and the cashier’s identity, combined with the
user’s mobile identity, the new nonce and the M-coupon. At
this stage the user’s mobile is authenticated to the cashier. The
cashier can stop the protocol at this stage in case of an attack.
Finally, the cashier sends the bonus and authenticates itself to
the user by signing its nonce with the user’s nonce, the user’s
identity and the bonus. At this stage the user makes sure the
bonus came from the cashier.
There are two ways in which the user’s mobile can com-
municate with a Trusted Third Party, online or offline. If the
NFC M-coupon scheme is used as a part of a mobile wallet,
the need for online access would be easy since the online
access would be already available to other applications. If
the NFC M-coupon is used as a separate application, off-
line authentication between the user and the cashier might be
performed by exchanging certificates generated by a Trusted
Third Party.
NFC configurations are very important in addressing a
remaining threat: the relay attack [21]. When developing an
NFC application, a user could be given the choice to start the
communication directly without any confirmation as a feature
of NFC (touch and go). Users should confirm any transaction
in the M-coupon scheme. This will not only help to address
the protocol attack, it will help to address the general NFC
relay attack as well.
We formally analysed the security of this solution with
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Figure 5. The Modified Advanced Protocol
Casper, and found no attacks. At the cashing phase, we were
able to examine systems with up to two different users and
two different cashiers.
VI. CONCLUSION
To the best of our knowledge, formal security analysis
has not previously been carried out in the NFC domain.
We formally analysed the security of NFC mobile coupon
protocols proposed by Dominikus and Aigner [12], by using
Casper. Our analysis identified an attack against the advanced
protocol: that an intruder could cash an M-coupon even if he
is not allowed to do so. This is because the M-coupon user’s
mobile generates signatures without including the identity of
the cashier. We suggested a mutual authentication between the
user and the cashier, and performed the same formal analysis
on the resulting protocol, and identified that the attack was no
longer present.
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